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Abstract
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regulation would discourage use, the costs—in terms of technological gains forgone—are potentially high.
Nonetheless, there is scope for regulation, to ensure one has recourse in the event of theft, as long as the
following are addressed: 1) provide a clear regulatory framework; 2) supervise transactions to dissuade
crime, without compromising the medium; 3) regulate exchanges, rather than users; 4) encourage
technological progress by committing to an environment of permissionless innovation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is a relatively new technology with much promise. As the world’s first
successful cryptocurrency, it functions as an alternative means of making electronic
payments. Its cryptography keeps transactions secure and protects merchants from
chargeback fraud. Its use of a blockchain, or public ledger, and distributed peer-topeer network to process these transactions seems likely to lower the costs of
transacting. The Bitcoin protocol, which simultaneously rewards those on the
network known as miners for processing blocks of transactions and ensures that the
bitcoin supply grows at a steady, known rate, prevents users from spending balances
they do not have while removing the prospect of unexpected and undesirable
monetary expansions. Seeing these benefits, some customers and businesses, large
and small, have already turned to bitcoin. And bitcoin proponents believe many
others will make use of it as the benefits become more apparent.
Despite these benefits, many regulators seem concerned. In the New Jersey
legislature, the Financial Institutions and Insurance Assembly Committee held a
hearing on February 5, 2015, to consider how best to regulate bitcoin (Higgins
2015b). In the same week, the New York Department of Financial Services released
a revised draft version of its BitLicense proposal that would require some entities in
the bitcoin community to be licensed by the state (Rizzo 2015c). At the federal level,
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has offered guidance on how
bitcoin will be treated within its existing regulatory frameworkz (FinCEN 2013). The
US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) took action against an
unregistered bitcoin options trading platform in September 2015 (CFTC 2015). In
December 2015, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged two
bitcoin mining companies and their founder with fraud (SEC 2015). In all of the
efforts to regulate or apply existing regulations to bitcoin to date, there is a strong
presumption that something must be done.
There are three principal justifications for regulating bitcoin: to protect
consumers, to prevent illegal transactions and transfers, and to promote broader
macroeconomic policy goals. Such justifications imply that there are potential
benefits to regulating bitcoin. Of course, regulations also impose costs. In addition
to compliance costs, excessive regulation could dissuade some or all users from
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transacting in bitcoin and, hence, from realizing the benefits thereof. Efficient
regulation requires that the rules adopted, and the extent to which those rules are
enforced, are limited to cases in which the benefits exceed the costs.
In this chapter, I consider the three principal justifications for regulating bitcoin.
Since efficient regulation is the goal, I consider the merits of each justification by
assessing the extent of the problem regulation might address, the likely effectiveness
of regulation in addressing that problem, and the likely costs of regulation on the
regulated actors and the system as a whole. I conclude by offering some simple
guidelines for regulators. Ideally, such guidelines would bring about a superior
regulatory framework. If nothing else, though, one can hope that some regulatory
clarity will emerge soon.
2. CONSUMER PROTECTION
Justifications for consumer protection regulation generally come in naïve and more
sophisticated forms. Both views suggest that some consumers will be exploited,
defrauded, misled, or otherwise taken advantage of in the absence of regulation. 1
The naïve view assumes, at least implicitly, that (1) consumers are never willing to
acquire the requisite information to prevent being mistreated, (2) that competition
or the threat of competition is never sufficient to prevent mistreatment, and/or (3)
that the optimal amount of mistreatment is equal to zero. A more sophisticated view
recognizes that consumers are generally interested in protecting themselves and
will incur costs to do so; that firms are generally interested in maintaining
relationships with consumers over a long period of time and regularly incur costs to
keep consumers satisfied; and that, at some point, the cost of providing additional
protection to consumers exceeds the benefits. Regulation is desirable, in this more
sophisticated view, when it lowers the information costs to consumers or more

1

This need not imply that all consumers will be treated poorly; nor that all firms will engage in

unscrupulous practices. It merely states that, in the absence of regulation, some firms will take
advantage of some consumers. Of course, some firms might continue to take advantage of some
consumers in the presence of regulation—though those employing the naïve justification often
overlook this prospect.
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properly aligns the incentives of firms. Even then, regulation is unlikely to prevent
all instances of abuse.
When considering regulation on the basis of consumer protection, it is important
to understand who is being protected and from whom they are being protected. In
the case of bitcoin, the relevant agents include individual users, small business users,
large business users, e-wallet services, exchanges, miners, and mining pool
administrators. The term “user” refers to one making, accepting, or receiving
payments in bitcoin. E-wallet services refer to counterparties that enable users to
send, accept, receive, or store bitcoin more conveniently. Exchanges refer to services
that allow one to exchange bitcoin for traditional or other virtual currencies. Miners
are those processing bitcoin transactions via the Bitcoin protocol in exchange for
new bitcoin or transaction fees. Mining pool administrators refer to those organizing
a collection of miners and/or distributing payments to miners in the pool.
The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) lists three risks to
consumers using bitcoin: exchange rate volatility, lack of security, and the inability
to execute chargebacks.2 Let me consider each in turn.
2.1. Exchange Rate Volatility
One concern with bitcoin is that, to date, it has been characterized by a highly volatile
exchange rate. Over a twelve-month period, the dollar per bitcoin closing price on
the BitStamp exchange has ranged from a low of $209.72 in August 2015 to a high of
$467.42 in April 2016. 3 The average closing price was $340.32. The Bitcoin Volatility
Index shows that the exchange rate is less volatile today than it has been in the past. 4
Still, with a thirty-day estimated volatility around 1.52 percent, it is more volatile
than gold (1.2 percent) and other major currencies (0.5 to 1.0 percent).
The supply of bitcoin is exogenously determined and known in advance. The
observed fluctuations in the exchange rate, then, reflect changes in demand. Demand
2

The NAAG separates security issues into “hacking of virtual wallets or Bitcoin platforms” and

“fraudulent transactions.” Both are considered in this chapter under the general heading Security
Concerns. NAAG, “An Explanation of Bitcoin.”
3 All exchange
4

rate data used herein comes from BitcoinCharts.com.

The Bitcoin Volatility Index measures volatility as the standard deviation of daily returns for the

preceding thirty- and sixty-day windows. Dourado, “Bitcoin Volatility Index.”
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is volatile for many reasons. Since the network of bitcoin users is relatively small at
present, a user’s decision to buy or sell relatively small amounts of bitcoin can have
a significant effect on the price.5 Of course, such fluctuation becomes less prevalent
as the network grows. Uncertainty surrounding the future network size of bitcoin
also contributes to this volatility. If everyone knew that everyone else would use
bitcoin in the future, it would be very valuable today. On the other hand, if no one
will use bitcoin in the future, it would not be very valuable today. Unfortunately, the
future is, to some extent, unknown and unknowable. As our best guess of the future
network size of bitcoin changes, so too does the current trading price. Finally, the
future network size depends, in part, on the regulatory environment. The regulatory
environment is unclear at the moment and expectations about the future regulatory
environment might change as new evidence becomes available.6 Hence, if nothing
else, clarifying the regulatory approach to bitcoin could reduce exchange rate
volatility.
A volatile exchange rate makes bitcoin risky to hold. One might suffer huge losses
or realize huge gains over short periods of time. Fortunately, most agents are already
aware of the volatility and have taken steps to mitigate the downsides. Others are
being compensated for (knowingly) bearing this risk. As such, regulations intended
to mitigate the risks of exchange rate fluctuations are limited to (1) reducing
uncertainty by clarifying the regulatory environment and (2) providing general
information to users about the volatility of bitcoin.
At present, most bitcoin users—be they individuals, small businesses, or large
businesses—do not hold much wealth in bitcoin. They merely use bitcoin as a
convenient means of payment. Intermediaries, like Coinbase, function as an
exchange and e-wallet service. They permit users to convert traditional currencies
5 On the
6

network effects problem as it pertains to bitcoin, see Luther (2016).

See Brito and Dourado (2014). Under New York’s proposal, for example, it was “unclear whether

individual cryptocurrency miners would be required to obtain a BitLicense” (4); whether software
wallets and multisignature wallets are engaged in Virtual Currency Business Activity (VCBA) and,
hence, are subject to regulation as such (5–6); whether introducing an AltCoin constitutes VCBA (10);
what criteria will be employed by the superintendent to offer exemptions to chartered banks (13);
whether exempted banks are subject to custodial limitations (14); and so on.

Published by Journal of New Finance - UFM Madrid, 2021

5

Journal of New Finance, Vol. 2 [2021], No. 4, Art. 4

into bitcoin at the time of making a payment and permit the conversion of bitcoin
into traditional currencies (Luther and White 2014). Hence, a typical transaction
involves a dollar to bitcoin exchange, a bitcoin transfer from payer to payee, and a
bitcoin to dollar exchange. The payer can spend bitcoin without having held wealth
in bitcoin. The payee can accept bitcoin without having to hold bitcoin. Both incur a
small fee to convert into and out of bitcoin on the spot to make a transaction.7 If
neither payer nor payee holds bitcoin for an extended period of time, they need not
be concerned with—and will not suffer losses from—the fluctuating exchange rate
(Brito 2014, 3). As such, there is not much scope for protecting these users with
regulation.
Of course, someone must be holding bitcoin and, hence, bearing the risk of a
fluctuating exchange rate. Intermediaries accept this risk by (1) agreeing to convert
dollars to bitcoin and bitcoin to dollars at the current market rate when a transaction
is made and (2) holding bitcoin between transactions. Given that they knowingly
accept this risk and are compensated with a fee paid by the payer and/or payee for
intermediating the transaction, there is little reason to think they are in need of
regulatory protection. Moreover, the risk is arguably quite low for these entities to
the extent that they deal in a large number of transactions. Sometimes they will incur
losses. Other times they will experience gains. While the losses and gains from a
fluctuating exchange rate will generally cancel out, the gains from fees and a general
tendency for the value of bitcoin to increase over time with the size of the network
makes intermediating transactions a profitable venture.
Although not specifically addressed by the NAAG, one might also consider
protecting miners and mining pools from a volatile exchange rate. Miners incur costs
to process transactions. Since only the first miner to successfully process a batch of
transactions is rewarded with new bitcoin, miners frequently join pools to share the
rewards in proportion to the computing power each miner employs.8 Some miners

7 At

the moment, fees are in the neighborhood of 1 percent of the transaction value—much less than

traditional merchant accounts. Some, like BitPay, have forgone fees based on transaction value in
favor of a flat annual or monthly fee.
8 This

distribution scheme prevails because computing power determines the likelihood of success.
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might incur costs on the expectation that bitcoin will have a given value at the time
a reward is issued, only to be disappointed when bitcoin has a lower value than
expected. Still, there are at least three reasons to believe miners would not benefit
greatly from regulation. First, miners (like the intermediaries discussed) tend to be
sophisticated participants. They already know about the volatility of bitcoin and
have chosen to participate anyway. Second, rewards are paid out roughly every ten
minutes and miners have the option to exchange rewards for traditional currencies
on the spot. As with users, they need not hold their wealth—even that obtained
through mining—in bitcoin for an extended period of time. Third, miners have the
option to join mining pools and, if they do, receive a steady stream of payments from
mining. As with intermediaries, the gains and losses from a volatile exchange rate
will largely cancel out for miners receiving rewards (or a fraction thereof) regularly.
There is no denying that the exchange value of bitcoin is much more volatile than
that of many other assets. However, there is not much scope for improving matters
in this regard with regulation. The fluctuation stems from changes in demand. It is
widely known. And those in the bitcoin system have already taken steps to allocate
risk efficiently and compensate those individuals bearing the risk. As such,
regulatory improvements in this regard are limited to (1) reducing uncertainty
concerning the future network size by clarifying the regulatory environment and (2)
providing general information to users about the volatility of bitcoin. The latter is
desirable insofar as the regulatory authority can provide this information at a lower
cost than each individual user would incur collecting it.
2.2. Security Concerns
Another concern with bitcoin is the degree to which one’s electronic balance is
secure. Regulators naturally worry that the bitcoin system might be hacked; 9 that a
large mining pool might compromise the system; 10 and that digital balances might
9

“Virtual currencies are targets for highly sophisticated hackers, who have been able to breach

advanced security systems.” CFPB (2014).
10

The CFPB warns that the blockchain “is maintained by vast unidentified private computer

networks spread all over the world. It is possible that elements of these networks could abuse the
power that comes with maintaining the ledger, for example by undoing transactions that you thought
were finalized.” See ibid.
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be lost or stolen.11 Some of these concerns are unfounded or might be alleviated with
some simple precautionary actions, as I will discuss. Others are genuine, providing
some scope for regulatory action on the grounds of consumer protection.
Concerns about the core Bitcoin protocol are largely unfounded. Dan Kaminsky,
renowned security expert and Chief Scientist of White Ops, famously tried—and
failed—to hack the Bitcoin protocol in 2011 (Kaminsky 2013). Based on this
experience, Kaminsky concluded that “the core technology actually works, and has
continued to work, to a degree not everyone predicted.” By relying on algorithmic
and open source governance, the bitcoin system is able to process transactions
securely and ensure that only those users with the appropriate credentials can
transfer and receive a given balance of bitcoin.12
Recognizing that concerns regarding the core Bitcoin protocol are largely
unfounded is not to accept that the system is immune from attack. It is widely
recognized, for example, that the system could be compromised if a miner or mining
pool controlled more than 50 percent of the computing power on the network
(Berkman 2013). Since the Bitcoin protocol recognizes the longest blockchain on the
peer-to-peer network as legitimate, and since computing power is the limiting factor
for adding new blocks to a blockchain, a miner or group of miners with more than
50 percent of the computing power could outcompete other miners to produce the
longest blockchain. And, with such power, a miner or mining pool could prevent
other users from making transactions or undo past transactions, enabling users to
double-spend balances.
While possible, such an attack seems less likely in practice. For one, it would
require gaining and maintaining more than 50 percent of the computing power.

11

In its 2014 consumer advisory, the CFPB states, “If you store your virtual currency yourself ” and

“you lose your private keys, you have lost all access to your funds.” Moreover, “virtual currency wallet
companies may disclaim responsibility for replacing your virtual currency if it is stolen on their
watch.” See ibid.
12

Algorithmic governance refers to the actual code, which limits what users in the bitcoin network

can do. Open source governance refers to the formal rules and informal norms that have emerged
between Bitcoin Core developers, other developers, miners, and users. For a full discussion of these
issues, see Dourado and Brito (2014).
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When legitimate miners recognize a threat, they have an incentive to increase the
computing power they contribute to the system. If legitimate miners can regain
control, they can undo what has been done. Moreover, it is not clear that such an
attack is in the interest of the attacker.13 In weakening the system, an attack would
discourage users from participating. The value of bitcoin would fall as existing users
exit the system and potential new users refuse to join. Recall that miners are
rewarded with bitcoin after successfully processing a block of transactions. It is
therefore in their interest to promote the integrity of the system, since that would
bolster the value of the newly created coins they earn.
Recent experience confirms the idea that those in a position to make a 51 percent
attack are unlikely to do so. On June 12, 2014, the mining pool GHash.io maintained
majority power for twelve hours (Goodin 2014). It did not attempt to undermine the
system by double-spending or preventing transactions (Farivar 2014). A statement
issued by the mining pool noted that “the threat of a 51% attack . . . is damaging not
only to us, but to the growth and acceptance of Bitcoin long term, which is something
we are all striving for” (Smith 2014). Still, the price of bitcoin fell as some users
feared such an attack, thereby discouraging even benevolent mining pools from
gaining majority computing power (Hornvak 2014).
A law limiting the processing power of individual miners or mining pools to
something less than 50 percent might mitigate the threat of attack. However, for
reasons discussed previously, that threat is probably overstated in popular accounts.
Moreover, to the extent that miners can coordinate activities in private, it would be
difficult to enforce such a law. Finally, if such a law were applied broadly to other
cryptocurrencies, it might rule out permissioned blockchain protocols where a
smaller fraction of known users verify transactions.
Another security concern exists in the relationship between miners and mining
pool administrators. Recall that miners contribute computing power to a mining
pool in exchange for a share of the reward earned by any member of the pool. Hence,

13

Indeed, Dourado and Brito (2014, 5–6) “observe some self-regulation by the mining pools, which

are heavily invested in the success of Bitcoin. Whenever the top pool starts to approach 40% or so of
computing power of the network, some participants exit the pool and join another one.”
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miners must trust that the mining pool administrator will deliver on the promise to
distribute the reward. In practice, this is not much of a concern. Most pools pay their
miners several times a day (Dourado and Brito 2014, 4). As such, exploits along these
lines are significantly limited. Still, the relationship between miners and pool
administrators could be governed by standard contract law. It would not require
additional regulation.
For reasons discussed, the benefits from regulations aimed at protecting the
system from malicious miners and mining pools or miners from malicious mining
pool administrators are probably quite small. Moreover, the costs of such
regulations—to the extent that they discourage mining or the development and
implementation of alternative protocols—could be large. Recall that the bitcoin
system depends crucially on a large, diverse base of miners to ensure that only
legitimate transactions are executed. Discouraging mining would therefore
undermine the system’s ability to fend off attacks. Likewise, alternative protocols—
like permissioned blockchains—might provide many of the benefits of bitcoin at an
even lower cost. The regulatory framework should not discourage such innovations
except in cases where there is a clear and significant risk of abuse.
Other, more plausible security problems exist. Consider the prospect that an
inexperienced user loses bitcoin. Bitcoin can be lost when one loses a private key,
the hardware where one secures a private key fails, or the private key is not
transferred in the event of one’s death. In an oft-cited case, one UK man lost 7,500
bitcoin—worth approximately $1.90 million today—when he threw out an old hard
drive in 2013 (Sparkes 2014). Although most instances of lost bitcoin have involved
early adopters who left the network before bitcoin was very valuable, the potential
for losing bitcoin remains a problem for users.
The problem of lost bitcoin has some rather straightforward solutions. Users
could keep a backup of their private key; they could keep a paper wallet—that is, a
physical copy of their private key—and they could make arrangements for private
keys to be passed on in the event of death. Other solutions involve trusting a third
party (usually an e-wallet provider) with your primary key or employing a
multisignature wallet, which requires two of three digital signatures to make a
transaction, with the e-wallet provider maintaining one of the three signatures. In
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the first case, access is recoverable by providing sufficient identifying information to
the third party. In the second case, access is recoverable in the event that one but not
both keys held by the user is lost or irretrievable.
There are two problems with these solutions to lost bitcoin. First, the users most
likely to lose their bitcoin are probably least likely to obtain information on how to
prevent such a loss in advance. Their relative inexperience drives both results. The
bitcoin community has certainly taken steps to make this information widely
available. And, as noted, some e-wallet providers go beyond the mere provision of
information by requiring multiple signatures and/or maintaining a copy of the
private key. Nonetheless, regulators could potentially improve the flow of
information and, in doing so, might help those in the community discover and
establish appropriate security and insurance standards. Second, while reducing the
likelihood of losing bitcoin, the solutions outlined increase the risk that one’s bitcoin
will be stolen. Storing multiple copies of your private key increases the number of
places where your private key might be discovered. Trusting a third party with a
private key provides the opportunity for that trust to be broken. Moreover,
inexperienced users—those most likely to lose bitcoin—are probably also less likely
to secure private keys appropriately and less able to assess the trustworthiness of a
given third party. As such, the possible remedies to the lost bitcoin problem might
be worse than the disease.
What is the likelihood that a bitcoin is stolen? Perhaps it is greater than one might
think. According to one 2014 estimate, some 918,142.965 bitcoin worth roughly
$415.99 million had been stolen.14 Considering that, at the time of this writing, there
are roughly 15,558,175 bitcoin in circulation, a little more than 5.9 percent, or 1 in
17, have been stolen.15 Bitcoin can be stolen when one does not take the necessary

14 “List
15

of Major Bitcoin Heists.”

While considering the role governments might play in preventing bitcoin thefts, it is also worth

noting that government officials have perpetrated bitcoin thefts. In August 2015, former Secret
Service agent Shaun Bridges plead guilty to money laundering and obstruction charges in connection
with the theft of more than $800,000 in bitcoin. He is suspected of additional thefts as well. Higgins,
“US Prosecutors Believe Ex–Secret Service Agent.”
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precautions to protect a private key.16 The biggest heists, however, involve third
parties holding access to the accounts of multiple users. For example, the Japanbased bitcoin exchange Mt. Gox tops the list, losing an estimated 850,000 of its users’
bitcoin in what the company described as a “transaction malleability” attack that had
taken place— unbeknownst to users—over several years (Rizzo and Southurst
2014). A Tokyo Metropolitan Police investigation concluded that cyberattacks were
responsible for only 1 percent of the missing balances at Mt. Gox (Stucky and
Adelstein 2014). Whether such losses result from outside attacks, embezzlement, or
the mere mismanagement of funds, they illuminate the difficulties of keeping bitcoin
secure.
The blockchain technology presents an interesting problem for thieves. Although
users are pseudonymous—that is, their physical identities can be kept private—all
transactions taking place on the blockchain are publicly observable. Any user can
follow a stolen balance of bitcoin as it is transferred from one address to the next
(Edwards 2013a). Indeed, a small team of computer scientists, using only publicly
available data, was able to trace bitcoin stolen in well-known thefts to popular
exchanges. As they note, “following stolen bitcoins to the point at which they are
deposited into an exchange does not in itself identify the thief; however, it does
enable further de-anonymization in the case in which certain agencies can
determine (through, for example, subpoena power) the real-world owner of the
account into which the stolen bitcoins were deposited” (Meiklejohn et al 2013).
Others point out that “a well-equipped law enforcement agency could deanonymise
the network even further”(Dourado and Brito 2014, 7).
The prospect of theft presents, perhaps, the strongest case for regulating bitcoin
on consumer protection grounds. On one hand, bitcoin is vulnerable like other
electronic payment mechanisms and should be regulated as such. On the other hand,
bitcoin has unique features that might be leveraged by regulators to create an even
more robust system. If thieves can be prevented from cashing out large sums at
exchanges, for example, they are reduced to cumbersome alternatives to convert

16

Victims of theft are not limited to relatively inexperienced or unsophisticated users. See, for

example, Brandom (2015).
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digital balances into usable wealth. Knowing they will be unable to liquidate large
balances easily, some thieves will be deterred from stealing balances altogether.
However, the costs of preventing or delaying large-scale liquidations—the
legitimacy of which might be difficult to assess over short periods of time—might be
overly burdensome, discouraging some users from participating in the network
altogether. And, to the extent that exchanges or e-wallet service providers are
participating in the theft or mismanagement of funds, such regulations would have
little effect. A better option, then, would be to require e-wallet and exchange services
to (1) register with the proper authorities and (2) collect identifying information on
users before exchanging large amounts of bitcoin. In the event of a theft, the victim
would then have recourse to go after the appropriate exchange for assisting—
knowingly or otherwise—in the transfer of stolen funds and the authorities could
subpoena the information held by the exchange or e-wallet service provider. Such
regulations would be imperfectly designed and imperfectly enforced. Still, they could
have a significant effect on reducing the extent of bitcoin theft.
2.3. Chargebacks
Some regulators might be concerned by the inability to execute chargebacks under
the Bitcoin protocol without the current owner of a balance agreeing to return the
funds in question. This stands in sharp contrast to traditional, centralized payment
processing mechanisms that can reverse a transaction when a dispute is made.
Indeed, the inability to reverse transactions contributes to the problem of theft: it is
impossible to return funds to their rightful owner without consent of the thief. But
more mundane instances—like receiving a product of inferior quality or not
receiving a product at all—come to mind.
In being unable to execute chargebacks, the Bitcoin protocol is no different than
cash.17 And there are good reasons to permit such a payment mechanism. For one, it
prevents the sort of chargeback fraud that plagues small businesses (Maltby 2011).
Indeed, some shopkeepers save so much from the elimination of chargeback fraud
that they give their customers steep discounts for paying with bitcoin (Wile 2013).

17 As

with cash, transactions with bitcoin can be charged back when an escrow service is employed;

see Dourado (2013). Indeed, the company Bitrated offers such a service; see Perez (2015).
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It promotes international business as well (Brito 2014, 2). High rates of fraud have
led traditional payment processors to forgo business in over fifty countries,
preventing individuals in those countries from making convenient payments to
American businesses. In eliminating a large class of fraud, bitcoin makes transacting
with individuals in those countries possible—and profitable (Love 2014). Hence,
bitcoin has the potential to increase commerce for small and large businesses alike.
For better or worse, the inability to execute chargebacks under the Bitcoin
protocol is part of what it means to transact with bitcoin. Some users will no doubt
prefer a payment mechanism that gives them recourse when dealing with
potentially unscrupulous sellers. Provided that they are willing to pay the higher fees
that come with the ability to execute chargebacks, such users should eschew bitcoin
for traditional payment mechanisms. Others can enjoy the lower fees and unique
transaction networks made possible with bitcoin. Provided that consumers are
aware of the inability to execute chargebacks when making payments with bitcoin,
there is no compelling reason to reduce consumer choice in payment mechanisms.
3. ILLICIT TRANSACTIONS AND TRANSFERS
Bitcoin has attracted a lot of attention from regulators on the grounds that it might
facilitate illegal transactions and transfers (Brito 2014). Senator Charles Schumer
(D-NY) was among the first to take note, describing bitcoin as “an online form of
money laundering used to disguise the source of money, and to disguise who’s both
selling and buying the drug” (Wolf 2011). Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV) also
recommended regulation, given the “clear ends of Bitcoin for either transacting in
illegal goods and services or speculative gambling” (Greenberg 2014). Indeed, many
seem to believe “bitcoin is basically for criminals” (Edwards 2013b). Others have
warned that bitcoin might be used to fund terrorism (Brantly 2014). So, I will discuss
the merits of regulating bitcoin on these grounds.
To date, the sort of black market transactions of concern to Schumer, Manchin,
and others seems to comprise a small fraction of the total bitcoin economy. The US
Treasury Department found no evidence of bitcoin’s widespread use in funding
terrorism (Dougherty and Farrell 2014). Similarly, while media reports have
directed much attention at mail-order drug sites conducting business in bitcoin, the
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volume of transactions actually made through these sites is quite small. Consider the
Silk Road, which operated from February 2011 to October 2013 and was described
by one media outlet as the Amazon of drugs (Chen 2011). The best available
evidence, collected over eight months from late 2011 to early 2012, suggests that
roughly $1.2 million worth of transactions were made on the Silk Road each month
(Christin 2013, 213-14). More recent estimates put the figure at roughly $4.7 million
per month for the life of the site. 18 By either estimate, the volume of trading is quite
small for a global marketplace.19 Moreover, the monthly transaction volume for the
entire bitcoin system averaged roughly $206.34 million from February 2011 to
October 2013.20 In other words, Silk Road transactions comprised less than 2.28
percent of all transactions. Hence, even if regulations could eliminate all illegal sales
conducted in bitcoin, the benefits would be small. And the costs would be borne, at
least in part, by the much larger class of users employing bitcoin for legitimate ends.
As I have argued elsewhere, the “US government should find it awkward to
regulate bitcoin on the grounds that it facilitates illegal transactions. Its own
currency—and the $100 bill in particular—has done so for years” (Luther 2015). A
recent study maintains that 48 percent of the US currency stock is employed in the
domestic underground economy (Feige 2011). When this analysis is extended to the
world, one finds that roughly 76 percent of the US currency stock, or $960 billion, is
used to facilitate exchange beyond the reach of tax and law enforcement authorities
(Luther 2015). To the extent that bitcoin is like cash, the regulatory authority should
treat it as such.

18

These estimates, reported by Brito (2013), 2n2, are based on a forthcoming study by Nicolas

Christin that is not publicly available at present. Brito also explains why estimates put forward by the
FBI in the criminal complaint against Ross William Ulbricht overstate the volume of transactions.
19 For comparison,

annual revenues at Amazon totaled $74.45 billion in 2013. At roughly $6.2 billion

per month, that is more than 370 times the highest monthly transaction volume estimated for the
Silk Road.
20 Figures

calculated by author using data from “Estimated USD Transaction Value,” Blockchain.info,

last modified October 26, 2016, https://blockchain.info/charts/estimated-transaction -volumeusd?timespan-=-all
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Of course, bitcoin is not exactly like cash. It enables electronic transfers. As such,
it creates a trail for law enforcement authorities not possible with cash. Although
transactions are pseudonymous—that is, virtual addresses are not necessarily tied
to physical identities—all transactions are recorded in the public ledger, or
blockchain. So, once a criminal is identified in the physical world and linked to a
digital address, law enforcement agencies could potentially uncover a string of past
criminal transactions. Had they been conducted in cash, these past transactions
would be nearly impossible to trace. Moreover, to the extent that exchanges and ewallet services cooperate—or can be compelled to cooperate—the authorities could
uncover and investigate a criminal’s past trading partners, who might also be
involved in criminal activity.21 Hence, law enforcement agencies would perhaps be
better served by working with the bitcoin network rather than against it.
Furthermore, legal uses of bitcoin are likely to be more sensitive to regulation
than illegal uses (Brito and Castillo 2014, 26-27). Legal users often conduct business
with a physical presence; even those conducting business exclusively online often
make their physical identities known. Illegal users, in contrast, typically employ
anonymizing technology like Tor, preferring to conduct business on the so-called
dark web. Hence, the illicit transactions justifying regulatory action are exceptionally
difficult to stamp out. To the extent that regulatory efforts make transacting with
bitcoin more costly or cumbersome, one should expect legitimate users to exit the
network while illegitimate users merely avoid the channels through which such laws
are enforced.
There is no denying that bitcoin can be used to make illegal transactions and
transfers. The relevant question is whether the benefits of regulating bitcoin on
these grounds exceed the costs. Given that the fraction of bitcoin users engaged in
illicit transactions or transferring funds to terrorist groups is probably quite small
and regulatory efforts to stamp out such transactions are unlikely to succeed, it
seems unlikely that regulating on these grounds would produce many benefits. On
the other hand, the costs imposed on a system comprised primarily of legitimate
users in search of a few bad apples could be substantial. As such, the prudent course
21 Indeed,

some exchanges already seem to be cooperating. See Sparshott (2013).
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of action would seem to require investing in the requisite technology to deanonymize users in the event that they are suspected of criminal activity.
4. MACROECONOMIC POLICY
Regulators might also worry that bitcoin could impede the government in promoting
broader macroeconomic policy goals. As one commentator put it, bitcoin “looks like
it was designed as a weapon intended to damage central banking and money issuing
banks, with a Libertarian political agenda in mind—to damage [states’] ability to
collect tax and monitor their [citizens’] financial transactions” (Stross 2013). Having
addressed issues of financial monitoring and oversight previously, I now turn to the
extent to which the government would lose revenues or be unable to conduct
monetary policy effectively if individuals used bitcoin instead of dollars.
4.1. Budgetary Policy
When discussing illicit transactions and transfers, I have limited the analysis to black
market transactions. However, governments might also be concerned with gray
market transactions—that is, buying and selling legal goods or services illegally in
order to avoid sales or income tax. Whereas governments want to prevent black
market transactions altogether, they do not want to discourage the underlying
transactions taking place on the gray market. Rather, they want to force these
transactions out of the gray market so that they can collect taxes on the sales and
incomes supported by these transactions.
Tax evasion is already a significant problem in the United States. It has been
estimated that between 18 to 19 percent of total reportable income goes unreported,
reducing tax revenues by $400 billion to $500 billion per year.22 To the extent that
bitcoin obscures one’s identity, it could replace cash in such transactions. It is
unclear, however, whether bitcoin would promote additional tax evasion. On the one
hand, it is easier to hold and transact with large balances of bitcoin than cash, which
occupies physical space. As such, bitcoin might increase the scope of tax evasion. But,
as noted already, bitcoin offers law enforcement authorities a trail of transactions to
follow that they would not have if those transactions were made with cash. Hence,
22 Feige

and Cebula, “America’s Underground Economy.”
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bitcoin might fail to replace cash entirely in this domain. In any event, it seems
unlikely that the effect of bitcoin on tax evasion would be large, if only because tax
evasion is so pervasive already.23
In addition to revenues raised through taxing income and sales, governments earn
seigniorage revenue from issuing base money. Seigniorage revenue results from
holding interest-bearing assets purchased with base money. In the United States, the
Treasury’s Bureau of Engraving and Printing produces currency and sells it to the
Federal Reserve System at cost. The Federal Reserve uses this currency and the
balances it creates on its books as reserves held at the Federal Reserve to purchase
interest-bearing assets. Then, after covering its operating costs, the Federal Reserve
remits the net income to the Treasury. If demand for base money—that is, currency
and reserves held at the Federal Reserve— were to fall as individuals switch to
bitcoin, the Federal Reserve would earn less income and therefore remit less to the
Treasury. As such, some have warned that the federal government would lose
seigniorage revenues if bitcoin were adopted (Davies 2014). In practice, the loss of
revenues would be small. In 2013, Fed remittances to the Treasury totaled $79.6
billion—just 0.53 percent of current expenditures by the federal government
(Hendrickson, Hogan and Luther 2016). Moreover, the extent of revenues lost would
be proportional to the number of users switching from dollars to bitcoin. If bitcoin
were to function as a niche currency, adopted by a subset of potential users or used
in conjunction with dollars, the decline in revenues would be far less than the total
amount of remittances.24 Hence, the benefits of regulating bitcoin on these grounds
are quite small. Moreover, sustaining seigniorage revenues in the face of competition
from bitcoin would require dissuading some or all users from transacting with
bitcoin when, by their own assessments, bitcoin is the preferred alternative. Hence,
the costs of regulating bitcoin on these grounds—roughly equal to the losses that
23 Bitcoin might

make it easier to hide more of one’s wealth in financial assets. But that wealth is only

valuable insofar as it can be exchanged for other goods and services. Suggesting that bitcoin will have
a significant effect on tax evasion amounts to claiming individuals are able to hide a significantly
larger portion of their purchases. Given that just a little less than one-fifth of income is going
unreported already, that seems unlikely.
24 Luther (2016,

30–34) discusses bitcoin’s prospects as a niche currency.
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users experience from employing an inferior base money—could be quite large. As
such, regulating bitcoin on the grounds that it would reduce revenues would almost
certainly be inconsistent with the principle of efficient regulation.
Monetary Policy
Others are concerned that bitcoin will prevent the Federal Reserve from conducting
monetary policy effectively.25 Indeed, this is in part why Nobel Prize– winning
economist Paul Krugman (2013) advanced the claim that “bitcoin is evil.”26 The view
is relatively straightforward: if individuals use bitcoin instead of dollars as money,
the Federal Reserve will not be able to control the supply of money in circulation.
There is some truth to this view. The supply of bitcoin is built into the Bitcoin
protocol. A central monetary authority cannot control it. Moreover, the protocol
cannot be modified without the consent of a majority of users on the system. And, at
least for bitcoin, changes to the money supply rule are widely considered to be off
the table (Dourado and Brito 2014, 5).
Many users like the money supply constraint embedded in the Bitcoin protocol. The
protocol ensures that a predetermined amount of bitcoin enters the system every
ten minutes. The precise amount of bitcoin created, which serves as a reward for
those processing transaction blocks, is cut in half roughly every four years. Prior to
November 2012, the reward totaled 50 bitcoin. Later it was halved to 25 and again
to 12.5. Roughly every two weeks, the system confirms that a block of transactions
was processed every ten minutes on average. It then adjusts the difficulty of the
cryptographic problem required to process transactions to ensure that the tenminute processing time is achieved. Since new bitcoin are only created when a block
is processed, the supply grows steadily at a declining rate over time.

25 Note

that such a view implicitly accepts that the Fed is able to conduct monetary policy effectively

in the absence of bitcoin. The historical record raises doubts on this point. See Selgin, Lastrapes, and
White (2012).
26

A vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis has acknowledged that “the threat of

Bitcoin (and of currency substitutes in general) places constraints on monetary policy”; see
Andolfatto (2015). Similarly, a representative of the Bank of Canada has warned that, if bitcoin were
widely adopted, “central banks would struggle to implement monetary policy”; see Higgins (2015a).
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There are at least two problems with the view that bitcoin undermines the Federal
Reserve’s ability to conduct monetary policy, thereby generating macroeconomic
instability. First, bitcoin will have little effect on macroeconomic fluctuation if the
dollar continues to function as the actual or effective unit of account (Dourado and
Brito 2014, 6). Textbook models of macroeconomic fluctuation depend on so-called
sticky prices that do not adjust instantaneously. If prices are denominated in dollars,
the Federal Reserve will not lose control of monetary policy.
It seems likely that the dollar will continue to serve as the unit of account. Most
bitcoin transactions at present involve goods or services actually priced in dollars,
with the transaction being made at the current market rate. One entrepreneur has
even developed digital price tags that update the bitcoin-price of products at current
market rates, given the dollar prices chosen by merchants (Luther and White 2014).
Hence, even when bitcoin prices are employed, the dollar often continues to function
as the effective unit of account. If such a state persists, one need not be concerned
that bitcoin will generate undesirable macroeconomic fluctuation.
Second, the Fed only loses control of monetary policy to the extent that individuals
choose to switch from dollars to bitcoin. Considering that network effects favor the
incumbent money, such a switch would indicate that the net gains from switching to
bitcoin are perceived to be large (Luther 2016). Such gains would be large, for
example, if the Federal Reserve were not very good at managing the money supply.
But, in this case, the Federal Reserve could discourage the switch by committing to
offer better monetary policy. In this view, bitcoin would function as a desirable check
on monetary mischief.
The potential effect of bitcoin on monetary policy ranges from inconsequential to
serving as a desirable check on the monetary authority. In the former case, there are
no gains from regulating bitcoin on these grounds. In the latter case, regulation
would almost certainly reduce the attractiveness of monetary policy. Hence, bitcoin
should be welcomed on the grounds of promoting monetary stability.
5. CONCLUSION
Bitcoin—and the blockchain technology at its core—offers users many benefits over
existing alternatives. When considering regulation, then, one should think carefully
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about the likely costs and benefits. I have reviewed the three principal justifications
for regulating bitcoin. The scope for efficient regulation is limited in two ways. First,
private governance structures and fee-based services have already begun
addressing many of the known problems, such as protecting consumers from
volatile exchange rates and preventing them from losing access to their accounts. As
such, the benefits from regulation are typically low. Second, since most regulations
would have the (intended or unintended) consequence of discouraging use, the
costs—in terms of technological gains forgone—are potentially high. Nonetheless,
there seems to be some scope for regulation in the provision of information and
requirement of registration, thereby ensuring one has recourse in the event of theft.
Regulators interested in efficient regulation would do well to follow certain
guidelines.
1. Clarify the regulatory framework. Provided that the gains from bitcoin are as
large as many proponents believe, entrepreneurs can find ways to work within a
wide range of regulatory frameworks. However, they cannot move forward
confidently until the regulatory framework is settled.27 Much clarity is needed,
at the moment, over (1) who the appropriate regulators are, (2) what existing
rules apply to bitcoin, and (3) what future rules are likely to be adopted. Clarity
along these lines will enable entrepreneurs to take the requisite actions today. It
will also allow users to make a more informed decision regarding whether the
currency will be useful for their desired ends.
2. Regulate transactions—not the transactions medium. To the extent that
some transactions and transfers are deemed undesirable, the government
should attempt to prevent them, at least insofar as the benefits of preventing
them exceed the costs. However, the government should attempt to prevent these
transactions without criminalizing the transactions medium. In the case of drug
transactions, for example, that means buy-busts and monitoring similar to that
currently employed for such transactions traditionally made in cash. Attempting

27 Some

banks have refused to work with bitcoin companies, citing regulatory uncertainty; see Rizzo,

“Bank Stops Working with Bitcoin Exchange.” Bitcoin ATMs have also been halted; Rizzo (2015b).
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to prevent such transactions by regulating the transactions medium imposes
costs on legitimate users while having little effect on criminal users.
3. Regulate exchanges—not users, miners, mining pool administrators, or
software developers. Many of the benefits of regulation can be realized by
merely requiring large exchanges to register and collect identifying information
on users exchanging bitcoin. Moreover, since such enterprises are large nodes in
the bitcoin system, the costs of regulating them are probably low. Regulations
that discourage users from adopting bitcoin, miners from processing blocks of
transactions, or software developers from offering new programs to track, store,
or transfer bitcoin, by contrast, are likely to impose large costs. As such, the latter
should be avoided.
4. Err on the side of technological progress. Technological change is the primary
driver of economic growth. New technologies are often disruptive, but
entrepreneurs often react to these growing pains by making improvements to
the underlying technology or developing ancillary products and services to ease
the transition. Regulators should encourage technological progress by
committing to an environment of permissionless innovation (Thierer 2016).
Reaffirm that those who venture out in search of better ways of doing things will
be rewarded when they succeed. And, to the extent possible, reduce the barriers
to such ventures.
Bitcoin is still in its infancy. Over the last seven years, users have joined the network;
exchanges have made it easier to enter and exit; e-wallet services have made it more
convenient to store and transact with bitcoin; miners have found ways to lower costs
of processing transactions; and entrepreneurs more generally have developed a host
of products in the bitcoin system. There are still problems with the bitcoin system—
it is far from perfect. Some of these problems can and will be addressed with
additional innovation. Others will, no doubt, require regulation. However, in
pursuing the latter, one would do well to keep an eye to the future. Regulators should
not let the minor problems of today justify preventing major gains in the future.
Instead, regulators should aim to adopt only those regulations that deliver large
benefits at a low cost.
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